Local policies in the form of amendments to the annual budget by congresspersons are traditionally associated with inefficiency, clientelism, patronage, and corruption. A recent study on the subject by Carlos Pereira, a professor at FGV’s Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE), co-authored by professors Lúcio Renno and Frederico Bertholini, was published in the journal ‘Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions’, one of the most prestigious international journals in the field of governance and public policy.

The paper, titled ‘Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level’, investigates the impact of local policies, popularly known as pork barrel, between 1999 and 2010. Despite these policies being frowned upon, the study points out that the municipalities that received more funds from parliamentary amendments, and for a longer period of time, showed substantive improvements both in social indicators (lower infant mortality or school-age lag) and economic indicators (employment and income).

On the other hand, the study also concluded that these initially positive results are not sustained over time, suggesting a sort of dissipative or inefficient inclusion. According to Carlos Pereira, this is due to the assignment of local funds of a parliamentary origin following the congressperson’s logic of political survival, and not necessarily the needs of the municipality.

The study is available on the website, in English.